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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Body Flap Subsystem FMEA/CIL
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206,_nstructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Body Flap (BF)
hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to
the NASA FMEA/CILbaseline with proposed Post 51-L updates
included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison
is provided through additional analysis as required. This report
documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BF
hardware.
The IOA product for the BF analysis consisted of forty-three
failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in nineteen potential
critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA
baseline (as of 7 December 1987) which consisted of (Note I)
thirty-four FMEAs and fifteen CIL items. The comparison
determined if there were any results which had been found by the
IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This comparison produced
agreement on all CIL items. Based on the pre 51-L baseline, all
non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement. Based on discussions with
the NASA subsystem manager, no additional non-CIL FMEAs are
anticipated for the Post 51-L update. Figure 1 presents a
comparison of the propsed Post 51-L NASA baseline, with the IOA
recommended baseline, and any issues.
Note i. The correlation and comparison of NASA FMEA Non-CIL
items is based on the Pre 51-L baseline since all Post 51-L FMEAs
have not been received as of the date of this report.
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Figure 1 - BODY FLAP FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined fn
Appendix B.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The following sections describe the BF actuator system hardware.
This hardware comprises a PDU, rotary actuators, and torque
tubes. An overview of the system components is shown in Figure 2.
3.1 Design and Function
The BF is a large aerosurface at the trailing edge of the lower
aft fuselage of the Orbiter. The proper function of the BF is
essential during the ascent phases of flight. During ascent, the
BF trails in a fixed position. For entry, the BF provides elevon
load relief, trim control, and acts as a main engine heat shield.
The BF system design provides a triple redundancy, eiectronically
c6ntrolledhydr0-mechanical drive system. The Flight Control
System (FCS) provides signals to the Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
(ASA) which commands valve packs supplying pressurized fluid to
power hydraulic motors. These motors drive torque tubes which
power rotary actuators and move the BF aerosurface.
The BF PDU comprises three in-line filters, three enable solenoid
valves, six pilot solenoid valves, three power spool assemblies,
one summing link, three hydraulic motor/brake assemblies, and a
PDU geartrain assembly (Figure 3).
Three Orbiter hydraulic loops, each corresponding to an Auxiliary
Power Unit (APU), supply fluid pressure for the BF drive system.
Each PDU is protected by an in-line hydraulic fluid filter up-
stream of the solenoid valves. Nominally, threehydraulic loops
are used to drive the BF. Full BF performance can be maintained
using two hydraulic systems. One hydraulic drive system can
power the BF at full force, but at half rate.
Each enable solenoid valve (Figure 4) controls the flow of
hydraulic fluid to the downstream pilot solenoid valves. These
solenoids contains a normally closed valve. A coil spring
provides the restoring force which maintains a closed valve
position. When energized by an ASA signal, the solenoid provides
a force which overcomes the return spring and allows fluid to
pressurize downstream pilot solenoid valves.
The BF pilot solenoid valves divert hydraulic fluid and pressure
to the downstream control actuator or power spool. The upstream
enable solenoid valve must be opened before hydraulic fluid and
pressure can flow to the pilot solenoid valves. When an up or
down pilotsolenoid valve is selected and activated, hydraulic
fluid flows thru the control actuator and rotates the hydraulic
motor in the corresponding direction.
The power spools control the flow of hydraulic fluid and pressure
to the hydraulic motor/brake assemblies. The power spools are
situated downstream of the hydraulic inlet and the enable/pilot
solenoid valves. The three power spools are mechanically
connected by two summing links. The actuators will translate in
one direction for an up command and in the opposite direction for
a down command.
The BF actuator recirculation valve is used to divert hydraulic
fluid around the actuator if system pressure drops below 850 psi.
When hydraulic system pressure is in a nominal range
(approximately 3000 psi), the recirculation valve is open and
fluid pressurizes the BF actuator.
The summing link is designed to mechanically synchronize the
movement of the BF power spools. If one power spool fails to
operate (i.e. jammed solenoid valve, loss of ASA signal, etc.),
one piston is capable of dragging the remaining two systems thru
the summlng link to their proper positions. This will direct
hydraulic fluid to the motor/brake assemblies and permit them to
operate nominally.
The hydraulic motor/brake assembly comprises a hydraulic motor
and brake (Figure 5). The hydraulic motor and brake share a
common centerline shaft. Each of three hydraulic motor/brake
assemblies convert 3000 psi fluid pressure to rotary shaft
motion. The assemblies also prevent the differential gearbox
from back-driving when the systems are unpressurized.
The hydraulic motor converts hydraulic fluid pressure to rotary
motion of the differential gearbox input torque tubes. The motor
contains a rotating barrel housing multiple pistons. As each
piston passes by the inlet, hydraulic pressure forces each piston
out of the rotary barrel transferring force to the motor's fixed
ramp wobble-plate which rotates the shaft. This shaft extends
out of the motor housing into the hydraulic brake portion of the
assembly.
The hydraulic brake is situated between the hydraulic motor and
the differential gearbox input torque tubes. The brake is
normally engaged, preventing the common motor/brake assembly
shaft from rotating or back-driving. When fluid pressure is
diverted to the hydraulic brake, it disengages and the shaft
transmits rotary power to its corresponding torque tube.
The PDU geartrain assembly (Figure 6) comprises three input
torque tubes, a differential gearbox, and one output driveshaft.
The splined input torque tubes transmit rotary shaft power from
the hydraulic motor/brake assembly to the differential gearbox.
The differential gearbox sums the input of three hydrau!ic motor
torque tubes into one output shaft. The gearbox uses two sets of
planetary gears to sum the torque tube inputs. One driveshaft
transmits the output of the differential gearbox to a beveled
gear. The full performance of the BF can be maintained with two
torque tube inputs. The BF can be driven at half-speed with one
torque tube input.
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The PDU geartrain assembly contains two 35-watt heaters mounted
to the gearbox. These heaters are used when the vehicle's
attitude is thermally cold.
The PDU geartrain assembly output driveshaft position is measured
by a four Rotary Variable Differential Transformers (RVDTs)
mounted on a common bracket. Any one of the four RVDTs is
capable of measuring the driveshaft position. ASA channel four
receives the RVDTs output and transmits them to the GPCs for
determining BF position.
The rotary actuators (Figure 7) connect the BF to the Orbiter and
provide the hinge-moment required to move the surface up or
down. The rotary actuators receive torque and power from four
torque tubes (Figure 8) connected to the beveled gear at the PDU
gearbox driveshaft.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The BF system hardware is located at the trailing edge of the
Orbiter's lower fuselage. The BF system interfaces with the
Orbiter's three hydraulic systems (each corresponding to one
APU). The BF system hardware interfaces with the ASAs which in
turn interface with the FCS portion of the GPCs for system
control actuation and feedback.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy Of the BF hardware and the
corresponding subcomponents. Figures 3 through 8 comprise the
detailed system representations.
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Figure 2 - BODY F_P SUBSYSTEM O_RVIEW
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Figure 3 - BODY FLAP POWER DRIVE UNIT
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Figure 4 - BODY F_P SOLENOIDS _D HYD_ULIC ACTUATORS
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Figure 6 - BODY FLAP DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX AND ROTARY ACTUATOR
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Figure 7 - GEARED ROTARY ACTUATOR
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Figure 8 "- TYPICAL TORQUE TUBE
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the BF hardware initially generated thirty-
six failure mode worksheets and identified nineteen Potential
Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In
order to facilitate comparison, seven additional failure mode
analysis worksheets were generated. These analysis results were
compared to the proposed NASA Post 51L baseline (20 May 1987) of
(Note I) 34 and 20 CIL items and the updated (7 December 1987)
version (Note i) 34 FMEAs and 15 CIL items. The discrepancy
between the number of IOA and NASA FMEAS can be explained by the
different approach used by NASA and IOA to group failure modes.
Upon completion of the assessment and after discussions with the
NASA subsystem manager, an agreement between the NASA FMEA/CIL
items and the IOA failure modes was reached.
Note i: Have received Post 51-L CIL items only. Have not
received all the Post 51-L NASA FMEAs as of the date of this
report. Non-CIL items comparison was based on review of NASA Pre
51-L baseline and IOA analysis.
In the following, the unmapped IOA column is the raw number of
IOA failure modes. The mapped IOA column is the number of IOA
failure modes after they have been mapped into the NASA FMEAs.
The issues column is the IOA failure modes that were unable to be
mapped into NASA FMEAs.
BF IOA IOA
Elements Unmapped Mapped NASA Issues
PDU 41 32 32 0
Rotary Actuator 1 1 1 0
Drive Shafts 1 1 1 0
43 34 34 0
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure modes identified and assessment. Appendix D highlights
the NASA critical items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID.
Appendix E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous analysis results reported in STS Engineering and
Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper I.O-WP-VA86001-23,
Analysis of the RSB, 3 December 1986. Appendix F provides a
cross reference between the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA
worksheets. IOA recommendations are also summarized.
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A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline and any issues identified is presented
in Table I. U
Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment
Component
o PDU
o Enable Valve
o Pilot Valve
o Control Valve
o Supply Orifice
o Filter
o Check Valve
o Recirculation Valve
o Summing Link
o Motor/Brake
o Differential
o Position X-DCER
o Rotary Actuator
o Drive Shafts
TOTAL
NASA
34
IOA
5
3
2
1
4
1
2
2
1
5
4
2
1
1
34
Issues
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
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Table II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment
Component NASA IOA Issues
o PDU
o Enable Valve
o Pilot Valve
o Control Valve
o Supply Orifice
o Filter
o Check Valve
o Recirculation Valve
o Summing Link
o Motor/Brake
o Differential
o Position X-DCER
o Rotary Actuator
o Drive Shafts
0
1
1
1
1
1
-4
3
1
1
1
TOTAL 15
0
1
w
1
1
1
1
4
3
1
1
1
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
TABLE III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality:
o PDU
o Enable Valve
o Pilot Valve
o Control Valve
o Supply Orifice
o Filter
o Check Valve
o Recirculation Valve
o Summing Link
o Motor/Brake
o Differential
o Position X-DCER
o Rotary Actuator
o Drive Shafts
1/l
w
i
w
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2/IR
D
1
u
g
1
1
TOTAL 9 3
2/2 3/IR
- 1
- 1
- 2
- i
- 1
3/2R
m
m
m
i
n
w
w
g
3/3
5
2
2
3
2
2
TOTAL
5
3
2
1
4
1
2
2
1
5
4
2
1
1
6 - 16 34
Of the failure modes analyzed, fifteen were determined to be
critical items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items
is presented in Table IV.
w
w
TABLE IV Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality:
o PDU
o Enable Valve
o Pilot Valve
o Control Valve
o Supply Orifice
o Filter
o Check Valve
o Recirculation Valve
o Summing Link
o Motor/Brake
o Differential
o Position X-DCER
o Rotary Actuator
o Drive Shafts
l/l
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2/IR
1
1
1
2/2
n
3/IR
1
1
1
3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
1
1
1
1
1
4
3
1
1
1
TOTAL 9 3 - 3 - - 15
i
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JThe scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers
Component IOA ID Number
o PDU
o PDU Elements
o Rotary Actuator
o Drive Shafts
BF-101; 102; 193; 194; 125; 126; 127;
204; 205
BF-105 thru BF-123; BF-128; BF-131 thru
BF-136; BF-201; 202; 203
BF-129; 129A
BF-124; 130
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4.1 PDU
Failures which were related to the PDU as an entity were
analyzed. Critical failures resulting in loss of vehicle/crew
were associated with gross loss of hydraulic fluid due to
complete seal failure, rupture of servoactuator in and downstream
of the switching valve (manifold, return lines, LEE plugs) and
hydraulic supply line rupture (one system). These failures
result in depletion of all three hydraulic supplies.
Non-critical failures were associated with internal components
which leaked hydraulic fluid. These leaks are contained within
the PDU and do not cause depletion of the hydraulic system
supplies. Other failures which were not critical were associated
with the PDU heater blankets which are considered redundant.
4.2 PDU Elements
Components which make up the PDU were individually analyzed. In
most cases, failures were included under one common assessment
when the failures of a component had the same effect on the
system operation. Those component failures which were analyzed
separately and had the system effect were correlated with the
NASA FMEA/CIL which combined like failures. Criticality 1
failures were associated with contamination of hydraulic fluid
which clogged filters and caused jamming of the hydraulic power
valve spool. Both failures result in loss of the BF function.
Mechanical failures (sheared shaft/Epline or damaged barrel/valve
plate) of the hydraulic motor/brake assembly resulted in
criticality 1 failures resulting in loss of the BF function.
Mechanical failures also result in loss of the differential and
mixer gearboxes causing loss of the BF function. The failures
were caused by fractures of gear shafts, splines or gears and
seized bearings. The failure of the position transducer assembly
(four transducers gauged together) also results in loss of the
RSB function. A mechanical failure in the transducer drive train
will result in loss of all four sanction transducers.
In summary, criticality I failures were due to i) hydraulic
contamination and 2) mechanical failures in gear drive trains.
4.3 Rotary Actuators
Analysis of the rotary actuators which provide the torque
required to move the BF surfaces showed that either an open
(gear shaft spline sheared, gear teeth broken) or a jam (seized
gear or bearing, overload resulted in the loss of an actuator.
loss of any one of the four actuators would result in overloading
the remaining actuators causing them to fail with the resultant
loss of the BF function hence loss of vehicle control.
19
4.4 Drive Shafts
The ten drive shafts transmit RPM/torque between the PDU and the
rotary actuators. Critical failures of the shafts were fractures
and gears shearing from the shaft spline. Three failures result
in loss of drive to or between the four rotary actuators with
resultant loss of BF control.
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2. Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, JSC 11174, 09-13-86
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Systems, Hydraulics, 10-28-75
4. R/I Integrated Schematics (V370-580996)
5. Shuttle Master Measurement List
6. FDF (Ascent, On-Orbit, Entry) (Several Different
Missions)
7. OMRSD/OMI, FCS Cross Reference - V58AGO, V79ANO,
V79ADO, V58AZO 04-08-86
8. Mechanical Console Handbook JSC18341, Feb 86
9. GN&C Console Handbook, JSC12843, 4/25/86
I0. Sketches, drawings reviewed with subsystem manager
ii. Handouts from preboard reviews 10-10-86
12. SD72-SH-0102-9 Requirements Definition Document,
Aero Flight Control Subsystem
13. NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL) 10-10-86
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
- Assembly
- Body Flap
- Brake
- Critical Items List
- Functional
- Flight Control System
- Failure Mode
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- General Purpose Computer
- Hydraulic, Hydraulics
- Hardware
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Motor
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Potential Critical Item
- Power Drive Unit
- Pounds Per Square Inch
- Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
- Rotary Variable Differential Transformer
- Rockwell International
- Valve
- Transducer
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level-G_rodnd Rules add Assumptions
Subsystem-SPecific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
i
I
B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTipLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW_PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins a£ SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
L_
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
,
,
.
•
o
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA _nalysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
w
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I
B.3 BF-Specifio Ground Rules and _ssumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the BF subsystem. The analysis considered the worst case
effects of the hardware or functional failure on the subsystem,
mission, and crew and vehicle safety.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the Assessment of the Body Flap Subsystem. The
information on these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the
NASA FMEA/CIL (Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis
worksheets included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets
identifies the NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC
Analysis Worksheet ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality,
redundancy screens, and recommendations. For each failure mode,
the highest assessed hardware and functional criticality is
compared and discrepancies noted as "N" in the compare row under
the column where the discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
- Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N - Non compare for that column (deviation)
C-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
i
i
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/8V
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-101
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021102-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
I01
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-102
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
102
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASAANALYSIS. SUMMING LINK WILL DRAG CONTROL
ACTUATORS (POWER SPOOLS) TO THE PROPER OPERATING POSITION.
HYDRAULIC MOTORS WILL DRIVE THE BF.
ALSO COVER BF-104.
THREE
NO PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION.
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-103
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
103
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA CRITICALITY. NASA LISTED FAILURE MODE AS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE " SAME RESULT AS FRACTURED HOUSING. HARDWARE
WAS BROKEN-DOWN TO A LOWER LEVEL FOR IOA ANALYSIS. NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
NOTE - THIS NASA FMEA ALSO COVERS BF-107.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-104
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
104
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] _ [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
SAME AS FAILED CLOSED.
DELETE.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
ONLY TWO SYSTEMS DRIVER. SAME AS BF-102.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-5
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-105
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021103-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
BODY FLAP
105
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE (UP OR DOWN)
R. WILSON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA FMEA - SUMMING LINK WILL DRAG CONTROL ACTUATORS
(POWER SPOOLS) TO THE PROPER OPERATIN_ POSITION. THREE HYDRAULIC
MOTORS ARE FULLY OPERATIONAL.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-106
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
106
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE (UP OR DOWN)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCURWITH NASAFMEA-S_ING KINK WILL DRAGCONTROL ACTUATORS
(POWER SPOOLS) TO THE PROPER OPERATING POSITION. _ T_EEMOTORS
DRIVE THE BF. NO PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-107
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021100-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
BODY FLAP
107
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE (UP OR DOWN)
R. WILSON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] C ] C ] [ N ]
mm
i
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mm
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA CRITICALITY. NASA LISTED FAILURE MODE AS
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, SAME RESULT AS FRACTURED HOUSING. NEXT
ASSOCIATED FAILURE WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
NOTE - THIS NASA FMEA ALSO COVERS BF-103.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-108
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
108
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE (UP OR DOWN)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if d i{ferentfrom NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SAME AS FAILED CLOSED - ONLY TWO DRIVING SYSTEMS. SAME AS BF-
107. AGREE TO DELETE.
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENTID: BF-109
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
BODYFLAP
109
ACTUATOR-CONTROLVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ] [ ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
g
B
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA. SAME AS BF-III. AGREE TO DELETE.
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT iD: BF-II0
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
ii0
ACTUATOR-CONTROL VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ ] C ] C ]
CP] CF] CP]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
..... INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA, SAMEAS BF-III. AGREE TODELETE.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENTID: BF-III
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021104-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
iii
ACTUATOR-CONTROL VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ i /l ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
mm
m
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/D E LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. FAIL IN DRIVE OPEN/DRIVE CLOSED
POSITION. THE FAILURES COVERED UNDER BF-109 AND BF-II0 ARE
DUPLICATE OF THIS FAILURE. DELETE BF-109 AND BF-IIO.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-II2
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021108-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 112
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENTID: BF-II3
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021101-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
BODYFLAP
113
RECIRCULATIONVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
l
m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA.
[ ]
[ ]
I
l
i
u
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-14
I
u
wi
== =
w
m
_-- ]
m
= z
s :
=
L_
m
mm_
= :
L_
--=
mm_
_7
m
m
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-II4
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021116-I
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 114
ITEM: SUMMING LINK
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-15
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mm
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-II5
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 115
ITEM: SUMMING LINK
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
I OA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ ]
[F]
[ N ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
b
B
L
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA. SAME AS BF-II4. AGREE TO DELETE.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-II6
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021109-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
116
HYDRAULIC MOTOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
_differe £ from_NASA)RECOMMENDATIONS: (if n
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. LOSS OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM WOULD BE
DETECTABLE THROUGH INSTRUMENTATION. NO ISSUE.
m
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m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-II7
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021109-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
117
HYDRAULIC MOTOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
mm
l
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mm
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m
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-II8
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
118
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N i [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
_ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
_CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. FAILURE WOULD BE DETECTABLE THROUGH
INSTRUMENTATION (SHOWING NO BF RESPONSE TO COMMANDS). BF WOULD
TRAIL.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-II9
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
119
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
me
mm
mm
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. TO RECOVER FROM A BROKEN BRAKE SHAFT,
SPLICE SHE_bdR_HAFT SEIZED, ALL APUs-_ST BE SHUT-DOWN THEN
INDIVIDUALLY RESTARTED AND AN AEROSURFACE MOTION TEST PERFORMED
TO IDENTIFY THE FAILED BRAKE. THE APU CORRESPONDING TO
THE FAILED UNIT MUST THEN BE SHUT-DOWN TO PREVENT TORQUE SPILL-
OUT. PROCEDURE COULD NOT BE PERFORMED DURING DEORBIT. ALSO
COVERS BF-120.
z
I
Z
i
mm
i
B
mR
[]
mm
u
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-20
i i
mn
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
L_
L .
D_
u
U
u
m
w
n
u
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-120X
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
120
HYD_ULIC BPJU<E
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA FAILURE INCLUDED UNDER ONE NASA FMEA. AGREE TO
INCLUDE BF-II9 AND BF-120 UNDER ONE FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-21
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-121
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021111-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
121
DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
m
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m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-122
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021111-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
BODY FLAP
122
DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. FIRST STAGE JAMMED GEARS, ONE SET.
IF A PARTIAL JAM OF THE PDU GEAR TRAIN OCCURRED, IT WOULD NOT BE
DETECTABLE IN-FLIGHT. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENTID: BF-123
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021111-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
123
DIFFERENTIAL GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ANALYSIS ASSUMED JAM OF ONE DIFFERENTIAL SET - IOA ANALYSIS
ASS_D ONE SHAI_r J_ED. CON_WITH NASA CRITICALITY. NO
ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-124
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021111-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 124
ITEM: DRIVESHAFT
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A S -
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[x] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
C I ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF'I25
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021115-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
125
PDU GEARBOX HEATER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
C ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
mm
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mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-126
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021115-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
126
PDU GEARBOX HEATER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENTID: BF-127
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021115-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
BODYFLAP
127
PDU GEARBOXHEATER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA E 3 /3 3
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
E ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
E / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-128
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021113-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 128
ITEM: RVDT (4-UNITS)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
] [ ]- [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
E
u
m
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
BF-129
02-4C-021300-I
BODY FLAP
129
ROTARY ACTUATORS
R. WILSON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
g
m
b
m
D
I
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. SEE NASA FMEA 02-4C-021300-I (JAMMED
ACTUATOR). FMEA COVERS BOTH FAILURES BF-129 AND BF-129A -
ACTUATOR JAMMED AND OPEN.
m
m
qmm
m
m
m
m
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-30
m
m
mAPPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
i
E
U
h
m
m
=
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-129A
NASA _EA #: 02-4C-021300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY F_P
129
ROT_Y AC_ATORS
_AD _ALYST: R. WI_ON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY _DUND_CY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_CO_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL _TENTION _TIONA_: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
__S:
CON_ WITH NASA _ALYSIS. SEE NASA _A 02-4C-021300-I - COVERS
BO_ FAIL_S J_D TO OPEN (BF-129 _D BF-129A)
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENTID: BF-130
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021200-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
130
TORQUE TUBE (FOR ROTARY ACTUATORS)
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
[x]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-131
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021110-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
131
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 7 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ix]
[ ]
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I
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-132
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021114-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 132
ITEM: FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
m
u
mm
mm
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-133
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021105-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
133
SUPPLY ORIFICE #i
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. ALTHOUGH BRAKE WILL BE _LEASED, "
LOCKED HYDRAULIC FLUID WILL NOT ALLOW HYDRAULIC MOTOR TO SPILL-
OUT TORQUE. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-134
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021107-I
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 134
ITEM: ORIFICE #2
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
n
m
mmm
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mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. THIS FMEA IS BASED ON NASA BASELINE
INFORMATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-135
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021106-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 135
ITEM: ORIFICE #3
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
+ [ /
(If different from NASA)
I c c i c ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. BASED ON NASA BASELINE INFORMATION.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENTID: BF-136
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021113-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 136
ITEM: RVDT
LEAD ANALYST : R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-201X
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021108-2
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 201
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA WAS PERFORMED POST-IOA ANALYSIS. CONCUR WITH NASA
ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-202X
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021101-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
202
RECIRCULATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NAS_ DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA WAS PERFORMED POST-IOA ANALYSIS. CONCUR WITH NASA
ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-203X
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021105-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
203
SUPPLY ORIFICE #1
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] C ] C ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA WAS PERFORMED POST-IOA ANALYSIS. CONCUR WITH NASA
ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-204X
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 204
ITEM: PDU
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
J
U
b
m
M
m
mm
U
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA WAS PERFORMED POST-IOA ANALYSIS. CONCUR WITH NASA
ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/_0/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT".
BF-205X
02-4C-021112-I
COMPARE [ / ]
BODY FLAP
205
PDU STOP MECHANISM
R. WILSON
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA WAS PERFORMED POST-IOA ANALYSIS. CONCUR WITH NASA
ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-901X
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021400-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BODY FLAP
901
SENSOR STRAIN GAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
C ] C ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
I
l
I
D
g
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO IOA FMEA PERFORMED FOR THIS ITEM. EQUIPMENT WAS DFI ONLY.
DELETE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: BF-902X
NASA FMEA #: 02-4C-021114-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
MDAC ID: 902
ITEM: FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
CONSIDERED BY NASA PREBOARD TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE.
DELETE.
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NASA FMEA
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
m
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w
02-4C-021100-I
02-4C-021100-I
02-4C-021104-I
02-4C-021116-I
02-4C-021109-2
02-4C-021110-2
02-4C-021110-I
02-4C-021110-i
02-4C-021111-1
02-4C-021111-2
02-4C-021111-5
02-4C-021300-I
02-4C-021300-I
02-4C-021200-I
02-4C-021110-3
02-4C-021114-2
02-4C-021105-2
02-4C-021113-2
103
107
Iii
114
117
118
119
120
121
122
124
129
129A
130
131
132
133
136
PDU
PDU
ACTUATOR CONTROL
VALVE
SUMMING LINK
HYDRAULIC MOTOR
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
DIFFERENTIAL
GEARBOX -
2ND STAGE
DIFFERENTIAL
GEARBOX -
IST STAGE
DRIVESHAFT
ROTARY ACTUATORS
ROTARY ACTUATORS
DRIVE SHAFT
(TORQUE TUBE)
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
FILTER
(ONE OF THREE)
SUPPLY ORIFICE #i
POSITION
TRANSDUCER
D-I
EXTERNAL LEAK,
COMPLETE SEAL FAILURE
EXTERNAL LEAK,
FRACTURED HOUSING
FAIL DRIVE OPEN/
DRIVE CLOSED POSITION
JAMMED
FRACTURED SHAFT,
NO TORQUE OUTPUT
OPEN DRIVELINE
FAILS TO BRAKE,
FRACTURED ACTUATING
SPRING, PRESSURE
PLATE
FRACTURED SHAFT,
SPLINE SHEARED,
LOSS OF TORQUE OUTPUT
SHAFT SEIZED
FRACTURED GEAR,
SHAFT, SPLINE SEIZED
BEARING, NO TORQUE
OUTPUT
ONE SET GEAR MESH
JAM, SEIZED BEARING
FRACTURED OUTPUT
SHAFT, SPLINE OR
GEAR - NO TORQUE
OUTPUT OR OPEN
JAMMED, OR OPEN FAILS
TO TRANSMIT RPM/
TORQUE
SEIZED BEARING,
BROKEN GEAR TEETH
FRACTURED SHAFT-
SHEARED SPLINE
OPEN DRIVELINE
FAILS TO RELEASE,
INTERNAL LEAK, STUCK
BRAKE SLIDE
CLOGGED
CLOGGED, LOSS OF BRAKE
LOSS OF MECHANICAL
EXPERT/ELECTRICAL
OUTPUT, ALL
TRANSDUCERS
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APPENDIXE .
DETAILED ANALYSIS .
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
23, Analysis of the Body Flap Subsystem, (3 December 1986).
Prior results were obtained independently and documented before
starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis
was performed to address failure modes not previously considered
by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being
analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in _$TS 22206. Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and
_, i0 0_tober 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
: =
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA - Not Applicable
i
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/3o/8v
BODY FLAP
120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYDRAULIC BRAKE
SHAFT SPLINE SHEARED
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BODY FLAP
2 ) ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
3) PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
4 ) POWER SPOOL-CONTROL VALVE
5) SUMMING LINK
6) HYDRAULIC MOTOR/BRAKE ASSEMBLY
7) HYDRAULIC BRAKE
8)
9)
i _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHAFT SHEARS INTERNAL TO BRAKE HOUSING - HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS MUST
BE SHUT-DOWN TO DETECT FAILED UNIT AND ENGAGE BRAKE TO PREVENT
TORQUE SPILL-OUT - REMAINING TWO SYSTEMS DRIVE BODY FLAP
NOMINALLY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/s6
BODY FLAP
201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHECK VALVE
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
POWER SPOOL
CHECK VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-053
CAUSES: JAMMED, CONTAMINATED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT - POWER SPOOL RECEIVES PRIMARY PRESSURE - BF IS DRIVEN
NOMINALLY. NOTE - THIS FMEA WAS PERFORMED AFTER THE BF ANALYSIS
WAS COMPLETED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 E-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86
BODY FLAP
202
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RECIRCULATION VALVE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BODY FLAP
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
POWER SPOOL
RECIRCULATION VALVE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: JAMMED, CONTAMINATED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE. LIMITE D PRESSURE BLEEDS TO
__'- MINIMAL 9_RFO_CE DEG_DATION. NOTE - THIS FMEA WAS
PERFORMED AFTER THE BF ANALYSIS WAS COMPLETED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86
BODY FLAP
203
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUPPLY ORIFICE #i
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
BODY FLAP
ENABLE SOLENOID VALVE
PILOT SOLENOID VALVE
POWER SPOOL
SUPPLY ORIFICE #i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: JAMMED, CONTAMINATED HYDRAULIC FLUID
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE. SYSTEM OPERATES NORMALLY.
NOTE - THIS FMEA WAS PERFORMED AFTER THE BF ANALYSIS WAS
COMPLETED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86
BODY FLAP
204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PDU
INTERNAL LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) BODY FLAP
2) PDU
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INTERNAL SEAL FAILURE - FLUID LEAKS TO RETURN LINE. MINIMAL
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE DEGREDATION. NOTE - THIS FMEA WAS PERFORMED
AFTER THE BF ANALYSIS WAS COMPLETED.
REFERENCES:
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
BODY FLAP FLIGHT:
205 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PDU STOP MECHANISM
FAILS TO STOP
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) BODY FLAP
2) PDU
3) PDU STOP MECHANISM
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITI S
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY sCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC621-0056-0053
CAUSES: FRACTURED SHAFT OR GEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
NO EFFECT, VEHICLE CAN WITHSTAND LIMITED CONTACT WITH BF. NOTE -
THIS FMEA WAS PERFORMED AFTER THE BF ANALYSIS WAS COMPLETED.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86
BODY FLAP
901
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: /
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SENSOR STRAIN GAGE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c [ ]
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/86
_ SUBSYSTEM: BODY FLAP
_ MDAC ID: 902
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HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: /
ABORT: /
ITEM: FILTER
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON SUBSYS LEAD: J. RICCIO
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B[ C[
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 E-9
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APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
m
L
m
=
i
= :
w
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
None. All initial IOA criticality and redundancy screen
differences were resolved with the NASA subsystem
manager. In addition, the combining of like failures
under one FMEA were agreed to.
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